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Introduction 
 
During the recent years, the Hungarian government initiated two main reform processes of the 
administrative justice system, which brought this issue at the core of the political and 
constitutional discussion in the country. Several contributions expressed diverse views about 
the preferred future of this branch of the judiciary, and a series of political decisions 
influenced its internal structure, and daily functioning. Our study aims to provide a brief, and 
concentrated summary of these endeavours and the conflicting approaches, and try to draw 
those conclusions of this discourse, which may orient the perspectives of Hungarian 
administrative justice regardless of which model we favour. Therefore, we aim to outline the 
main governmental and oppositional arguments also, and focus on the impact of populism to 
administrative justice. Since the reorganisation of the judiciary is a commonly fostered target 
of populist governments around Europe, we are convinced, that our considerations might be 
relevant not only for Hungary, but also for those foreign countries, which also deal with the 
review of their judicial system, with special regard to administrative justice. 
 
1. Some general points about the administrative justice 
 
Historically, administrative justice can follow two main forms: monistic or dualistic. In a 
monist system, ordinary courts deal with administrative matters, in which case the state is 
treated as a private individual. There are different solutions in the dualistic model, but one 
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thing that is common that all administrative matters is dealt with by separated administrative 
courts.
3
 
Obviously, there are exceptions and hardly categorizable countries which nonetheless can be 
put on a scale between the theoretic models. Aiming to create a finer categorization, we can 
recognize dualistic, imperfect dualistic, imperfect monistic and monistic systems. France, and 
certain southern European countries, like Greece and Portugal follows the dualistic model, 
and has a separate administrative court system, which rules over all administrative matters. 
The imperfect dualistic countries also have separate courts with jurisdiction in most 
administrative cases, but certain cases generally seen as administrative matters are ruled by 
ordinary courts. Countries like Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and some Scandinavian 
states follows this route. A separate group of countries in which legal remedy against the 
administrative decisions is primarily the responsibility of the ordinary courts, forms the 
imperfect monist group. However, in these systems the ordinary courts did not initially have 
the possibility to annul administrative decisions, an administrative judiciary emerged which 
took over certain powers from the ordinary courts. This has created a mixed system, which 
exists in Belgium and Luxembourg. The last category is the monistic one, where the ordinary 
courts decide in every administrative case. This group consist the United Kingdom, Norway, 
and Denmark.
4
 
The dividing line between the dualist and the monist model is now very thin. Bo(creating 
special administrative courts or keeping administrative cases within the remit of ordinary 
courts) are legitimate, and each has its pros and cons, with their evaluation depending largely 
on the context of the national court system. It’s a sovereign decision of any state’s legislature 
to create a distinct administrative court system. In the next section, this paper briefly presents 
the development of the Hungarian judicial system, with special regard to the establishment 
and development of administrative judiciary. 
 
                                                          
3
 László Trócsányi ifj. (1988): A közigazgatási bíráskodás szervezete és működése az egyes európai országokban. 
A jogintézmény elméleti alapjai és működési tapasztalatai, valamint egyes európai országok közigazgatási 
bíráskodására vonatkozó jogszabályok. [The organisation and functioning of the administrative justice in the 
different European countries. The theoretic principles, and the experience of this legal instrument, and certain 
laws on administrative justice in Europe.] Budapest, mta. 182. 
 
 
4
 Marianna FAZEKAS (ed), Közigazgatási jog, Általános rész III. [Administrativelaw III.] (ELTE Eötvös, 2nd 
edn, 2019) 324-327. 
3 
 
2. The history and evolution of the Hungarian administrative justice system  
In Hungary, simultaneously with the separation of public administration and courts, the issue 
of administrative judiciary arose at the second half of the XIX. century.
5
 After a long 
preparation, under the pressure of the king, in 1883 the organization and rules of procedure of 
financial judiciary were first established and then further developed by the legislature into 
general administrative judiciary.
6
 Not only organizationally, but also procedurally, a very 
mixed system has emerged: the only forum, the Royal Hungarian Administrative Court, has 
exercised a general power of changing the administrative decisions and thus was vested with 
very strong competences.
7
 
Following the abolition of the Administrative Court in 1949,
8
 administrative justice continued 
to exist within the ordinary courts in an extremely narrow range. The Soviet-style communist 
dictatorship regarded the rule of law as a particularly negative phenomenon. In this line of 
thought, the judicial control of state organs was an irregular and undemocratic concept, which 
was supposed to be in conflict with the supremacy of the popular will.
9
 However, the total 
denial of judicial control of state power was short lived. The Procedural Act (Et.), which 
regulates administrative procedures and was enacted in 1957, re-institutionalized the judicial 
appeal of public administration decisions as an extraordinary form of legal remedy - but in 
practice this opportunity prevailed only in a very limited circle. 
Until 1991, the possibility of judicial review of administrative decisions was the exception 
rather than the general rule.
10
 However, in 1991 - after the fall of the communist regime - the 
Constitutional Court stated that all administrative decisions should be subject to a judicial 
remedy (control).
11
 After 1991, a four-level judicial organization was gradually established. 
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The lower level of the organization was the local court with general jurisdiction in criminal 
and civil matters. The local court is called "district court" or "municipal court", depending on 
its location. The second level of the judicial hierarchy was the county court. The jurisdiction 
of each county court extended to the counties. The county court dealt with appeals against the 
decisions of the municipal court and it was the court of second instance against labor court 
decisions. 
The Court of Appeals was primarily the third level in the judicial hierarchy as an appellate 
court. In administrative cases the Court of Appeal in Budapest had exclusive jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal in administrative cases. The Supreme Court was the supreme judicial body of 
the Republic of Hungary, as it was the forum of last resort of appeals.  
After 2012 administrative and labour tribunals were set up at local court level.
12
 These courts 
were responsible for the judicial supervision of administrative decisions and rule on cases 
concerning labour relations. As it wasmentioned earlier, up to 31 December 2012, these cases 
were judged at first instance by local courts and labour tribunals.  
As part of the reform, the name of each court level was changed, restoring the unity of the 
historical court names. Instead of the Supreme Court, the Constitution again called the 
Supreme Court the Curia, a court of justice instead of country court, district court instead of 
Municipal / City court. In any case, the most important change affecting the judiciary was the 
establishment of administrative courts "in the same department as the labor courts"- it was not 
a separate body from the judiciary system.
13
So, Hungary already had and and still has a 
system of judicial review of administrative decisions within the framework of the court 
system.  
3. The first attempt to reorganise the administrative justice system (2016-2017) 
The first attempt to reform the system was in 2016, when the Government had announced its 
intention to set up a new branch of judiciaryfor handling administrative cases separately by a 
                                                          
12 András Bencsik: A közigazgatási bíráskodás helyzete és jövője – az új Alaptörvény tükrében. [The present and 
the perspectives of administrative justice - in the light of the new Fundamental Law of Hungary.] In: Varga 
Norbert (szerk.): Az új Alaptörvény és a jogélet reformja. Szeged, Szegedi Tudományegyetem Állam- és 
Jogtudományi Kar, 2013. 35–45. 
13
Herbert Küpper, ’Magyarország átalakuló közigazgatási bíráskodása’ [The changing system of administrative 
judiciary in Hungary] (2014 MTA Law Working Papers) 31 
<https://jog.tk.mta.hu/uploads/files/mtalwp/2014_59_Kupper.pdf>accessed 21 June 2020 
5 
 
distinct, high administrative court and changed the laws accordingly.
14
 The government has 
secretly prepared a bill that would bring significant changes to the organisation of 
administrative justice. Instead of administrative and labor tribunals, regionally-based 
administrative courts would review most of the administrative decisions at first instance, 
while the newly created Supreme Administrative Court would rule on priority cases and 
second instance.
15
 Read in conjunction with the draft of the Administrative Procedure Code, 
the Curia would have very limited powers in administrative matters. The bills, which would 
otherwise require a two-thirds majority, have been prepared in complete secrecy: the draft has 
not been published on the Government's website, nor has there been any substantive 
professional and social debate. Based on government practice so far, this in itself raised the 
question of whether only the idea of administrative court really floated before the 
government's eyes during the preparation, or whether some saw the opportunity to dominate 
the courts with this proposal.
16
In January 2017, the Constitutional Court decided that such a 
change would require an amendment of the Constitution, but without constitutional majority 
the government had no means to amend the constitution.
17
 
4. The second attempt to reorganise the administrative justice system (2018-2020) 
4.1. The package adopted in October 2018, and its preparation 
As we have seen, the first stage of the administrative justice reform failed due to the lack of 
necessary two-third parliamentary majority behind the government. However, the government 
retained its intent to establish a revised system of administrative courts, since it still hold the 
former arguments valid and compelling to restructure the existing model.
18
 After the 
legislative elections in April 2018, the FIDESZ/KDNP obtained again more than two-third of 
the parliamentary seats, and the Fundamental Law of Hungary was amended to provide 
constitutional basis for a separate judicial branch of administrative matters.
19
 The minister of 
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justice announced almost immediately, that the administrative justice reform will be put back 
to the agenda, and the relevant laws will be adopted before the end of 2018. 
The minister set up an advisory body from well-acknowledged experts of the topic, and from 
highly qualified lawyers, who followed and monitored the drafting process of the new 
package. It remained constantly controversial, whether the preparation of the relevant bills 
was sufficiently inclusive and transparent. The governmental sources highlighted, that a long-
term professional discussion took place about the matter of administrative justice, and the 
opinion of the advisory body was requested and considered about each proposal. By contrast, 
according to the oppositional views, this second stage of the reform was again prepared 
almost secretly, without convincing justification, and most of the stakeholders, including the 
administrative judges had only a limited access to the relevant information.
20
 
Surrounded by several demonstrations and intense political and professional debate, the laws 
on the new administrative system were enacted by the Parliament in December 2018, and 
envisaged a separate supreme administrative court on the top of the separate administrative 
justice system, distinguished from the Curia, the highest judicial body of Hungary. This court 
shall have been established in Esztergom,
21
in one of the historical capitals of Hungary around 
30 miles from Budapest, close to the Danube and the Slovakian border. Apart from the 
separate high administrative court, several administrative tribunals would have been created 
across the country, and the new bodies would have been broad competences to hear a wide 
range of sensible cases.
22
As part of this project, the whole legal framework for administrative 
cases: new act on general administrative procedure;
23
 and on administrative court 
procedures
24
 have been also passed.
25
 
The new act on administrative courts brought novelties in three main areas. Firstly, the 
structural independence of the administrative court was concerned,
26
as the new act would 
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have authorized the minister of justice to decide on the appointment of judges,
27
 on their 
promotion and honours,
28
and he/she could approve the organizational and operational rules of 
the administrative courts.
29
The supporters of these ideas consider these competences as 
limited ones, which are surrounded by the effective participation of judicial self-government 
bodies in these decision-making processes.
30
This solution is also in compliance with foreign 
examples within the European Union,
31
 for instance, Austria and Bavaria provide broader 
margin of decision for the minister of justice over the administrative courts.
32
 Moreover, 
according to this line of argumentation, the ministerial supervision with restricted scope 
would ensure the most fruitful functioning of the administrative courts.
33
However, the 
opposants saw a main thread of judicial integrity in these measures,
34
and considered them as 
incompatible with rule of law.
35
 It is beyond doubt that the judicial self-government bodies 
provide opinions before the ministerial decisions, but this could not serve as a proper 
counterbalance of the overstrong position of the executive.
36
Apart from this, the internal 
independence of each judge is also at least questionable due to the prerogatives provided for 
the leaders of the administrative courts.
37
Furthermore, administrative justice constituted a 
well-functioning system in Hungary,
38
therefore, it was not worthy to reorganise it at all.
39
 
Secondly, the staff of the administrative courts would have been changed remarkably by the 
envisaged reform. Those, who have dealt with administrative cases as judges could request 
the prolongment of their status as administrative judge. However, other persons, who comply 
with the requirements set for judges could also submit an application for a position of 
administrative judge, which shall have been assessed in the first instance by a body composed 
by judicial members and other experts. Nevertheless, the minister of justice would have had 
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the competence to review the outcome of this evaluation, and award the position without 
justification to a candidate other than the person, who achieved the most points.
40
The drafters 
aimed to promote professionalization of the administrative justice by providing equal 
opportunities for each candidate,
41
 and to secure such an administrative court system, which is 
composed by judges with diverse background.
42
 The minister has only a limited margin of 
movement, and his decision shall be mainly grounded on the judicial assessment of each 
application.
43
The counterarguments include the new attitude of judges, who will arrive from 
the public administration, and they would have brought a pro-governmental approach, and 
without any judicial experience, the instincts of an inherently hierarchic surrounding.
44
These 
circumstances at least question their ability to behave as independent judges in cases about 
politically sensitive matters, such as elections, referenda, taxes, public procurement, 
competition law and misuse of police powers.
45
 
Thirdly, the external influences of the impugned measures would be also considerable. The 
pro-governmental sources expected more transparent remedies, more foreseeable 
judgements,
46
faster and more efficient judicial review of administrative decisions,
47
and also 
the respect of historical traditions dated back to the first half of the XX. century.
48
Against 
these points, the often-rumoured negative consequences were the undermined credibility of 
the administrative courts, and legal uncertainty and unpredictability for private stakeholders. 
Due to these concerns, economic actors will be more reluctant to invest in Hungary, which 
would have lead to severe economic difficulties, and this would increase the vulnerability of 
the citizens from the state.
49
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Due to the high number of controversial issues, and the strong criticism even from domestic 
and international stakeholders, the government prepared a second package, which introduced 
several amendments on the original plans. 
 
4.2. Amendments in March 2019. 
The Venice Commission had announced that it was examining the recent Hungarian 
development in administrative justice, and it would issue an opinion from the adopted acts. 
However, the Hungarian government submitted to the Parliament the bill to amend the 
original version of the administrative justice before the publication of this opinion, or before 
consulting with the representatives of the Venice Commission about their views. Amongst 
others, the amendment prescribed the possibility of judicial review on the ministerial decision 
from appointing administrative judges, however only for those, who would have been 
nominated after 1 January 2020.
50
The critical voices highlighted, that half of the judges would 
have been appointed by the minister during 2019. and these judges will assess the applications 
during the later stages.
51
The amendment also strengthened the judicial self-governance by 
safeguarding the independence of the national administrative judicial council members,
52
 and 
also by removing the ministerial power to approve the organizational and operational rules of 
the administrative tribunals.
53
The competences of the national administrative justice council 
remained the same as according to the earlier version, so the opposants still hold the weight of 
the judicial self-government bodies insufficient to counterbalance the power of the minister, 
as the amendment of the planned reform package has not satisfied the expectations of several 
professional and political stakeholders. The acts on the administrative justice reform were 
contested before the Constitutional Court, which issued a ruling from this matter in June 
2019. and found the new system of administrative justice in compliance with the Fundamental 
Law of Hungary. 
 
4.3. The ruling of the Constitutional Court in June 2019. 
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As the first reform of the administrative justice, the second proposal was also referred to the 
constitutional Court by oppositional members of the Parliament, as they alleged its conflict 
with rule of law. The Constitutional Court concluded that thelead time was appropriate for the 
stakeholders, since the act on the administrative justice reform was adopted in October 2018, 
and its entry into force had been due on 1 January 2020. Even the amendments had been 
passed in March 2019, almost ten months before the expected establishment of the separate 
branch of administrative justice,
54
 which could not be interpreted as an extremely short time 
for preparation. 
After having considered this, the Constitutional Court focused on the separation of powers 
aspect, and taken into account the ministerial powers over the administrative tribunals. The 
body acknowledged, that the legislation has a broad margin of movement to determine the 
operation of administrative tribunals,
55
 the ministerial participation at the guidance of these 
entities itself does not violate any constitutional principle, or specific provision.
56
However, 
the minister shall not interfere to the judicial activities themselves, as this would undermine 
the independence of the courts.
57
 Nevertheless, the administration of the courts constitute an 
administrative task committed to the executive.
58
 
The reasoning highlighted, that the National Administrative Justice Council would have been 
a proper counterbalance of the ministerial pressure, as the majority of this body would have 
been judges, and its powers would be sufficient to outweigh the involvement of the 
minister.
59
The nomination process of the judges was also found constitutional as the judicial 
self-governing bodies play an effective role in the assessment of the applications. 80 % of the 
points awarded by the advisory body are grounded on objective criterion, so subjective 
grounds are just complementary elements of the system. The rules on the selection process are 
provided by law, and these provisions do not west the executive with undue influence on the 
final decisions, which are also subject to legal remedies.
60
 The active participation of the 
judicial self-governing bodies is also necessary for exercising the budgetary competences of 
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the minister. The safeguards
61
 are also proper to exclude the overbroad ministerial margin of 
decision on personal matters, and on the promotion of judges.
62
 
It is not worthy, that when this Constitutional Court ruling has been delivered; it was still 
questionable, whether this would be really significant, as the Government announced in May 
2019 the postponement of the controversial reform until further decisions. Therefore, the 
Constitutional Court confirmed the constitutionality of a system, which perspectives were 
uncertain, and later it turned out, that this decision was not relevant practically at all, at least 
in the short term. Nevertheless, the principles set out by the reasoning of this judgement could 
orient the legislation for future references, when the reform of administrative justice would be 
concerned. 
 
4.4. The postponement and the cancellation of the envisaged administrative justice reform 
It surprised the public opinion, that in May 2019, during the campaign of the 2019 European 
Parliamentary elections, the Hungarian Government announced that the establishment of the 
separate branch of administrative justice has been postponed until an undetermined date.
63
 No 
specific reasons of this step were provided, it is just probable, that the mostly hostile 
international surrounding and the actual political circumstances resulted this withdrawal. 
Several objections were made for the reform plans in a number of European forums, and also 
the European People’s Party threatened the major Hungarian governmental party, the FIDESZ 
with exclusion from its faction. The Hungarian leaders aimed to conclude a compromise to 
reduce the tensions within the European People’s Party during an electoral campaign period, 
which would have been harmful even for the European People’s Party, and the FIDESZ. 
Since the Constitutional Court upheld the whole administrative justice reform in its form after 
the amendments in March 2019, everyone waited for the introduction of the new system in 
January 2020. However, another unexpected twist changed again the situation: the Hungarian 
minister of justice informed the public from cancelling the whole administrative justice 
reform, probably due to the mostly critical domestic and international feedback. According to 
the official justification, the judicial system shall be protected from unnecessary disputes, and 
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the reform generated such a discussion.
64
 Although these points, the Government considered 
it still necessary to reshape the contours of administrative justice, therefore, further measures 
were also recommended, as will be analysed in the next two subchapters. 
 
4.5. The amendment of the act on the Constitutional Court in December 2019. 
After the second failed attempt to reformthe administrative justice, In December 2019 the 
Hungarian Parliament passed a series of bills, which amended several acts regarding also the 
functioning of the public administration, and the status of the judiciary, amongst others, the 
act on the Constitutional Court was also concerned. 
The new acts brought four such main novelties, which affects at least indirectly the status of 
administrative justice. Firstly, the first instance appeal against an administrative decision was 
abolished, and instead of this, a two-level judicial review process has been created, which is 
slower, and more expensive, than the administrative path.
65
 This step would enhance the 
significance of the administrative tribunals, as these courts shall hear legal controversies in an 
earlier stage, than under the previous system. 
Secondly, another amendment stipulates, that after the termination of their mandate, the 
former members of the Constitutional Court may request their nomination to the Curia (High 
Court of Hungary) as council leader judges, if the former constitutional judge complies with 
all the requirements set by the law for judicial appointments.
66
It was rumoured, that such a 
system would weaken separation of powers with direct personal link between the 
Constitutional Court and the Curia. From the other side the professional experience was 
highlighted, which these people could bring to the Curia after their service at the 
Constitutional Court.  
Thirdly, the amendment provides a more precise and detailed description of involvement in 
case of constitutional complaints against court judgements. The complainant shall be 
considered as involved, if he/she/it had standing at the judicial process;he/she/it is affected 
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directly by any provision of the court judgement; or his/her/its rightsorduties are influenced 
by the contested court judgement.
67
 
Fourthly, the new legislation reconsiders the concept of constitutional complaint remarkably, 
as it opens up the possibility for public authorities to submit such initiatives to the 
Constitutional Court, not only for the protection of their fundamental rights, but also their 
constitutional and statutory competences.
68
This approach is based on the recent practice of the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court, which has already vested certain state authorities, such as the 
National Bank with standing to submit constitutional complaints.
69
 This idea invigorated the 
discussion on constitutional complaint during the last months in Hungary, several arguments 
and counterarguments have been raised. 
The Government and the supporters of the amendment explicate, that constitutional complaint 
shall be a safeguard of the fundamental rights of all legal entities, therefore, public authorities 
should be also included within this concept as potential initiators. For instance, right to fair 
trial may be a regular ground of remedial requests submitted by state authorities.
70
 
By contrast, according to the opposing views, constitutional complaint against court 
judgements is such a legal instrument, which targets the protection of individuals against the 
state, therefore, public authorities shall be excluded from this opportunity. It is dogmatically 
false, that such entities, which exercise public power; have fundamental rights, and it is also 
possible, that this new circle of initiators would spreadthe Constitutional Court with their 
irrelevant complaints against court judgements. Moreover, the preservation of certain 
statutory competences falls outside even from the broadest acceptable interpretation of 
constitutional complaint.
71
 
The amendment in December 2019 was adopted as a replacement of the broader 
administrative justice reform, but the whole saga has not been still ended as the next 
subchapter will demonstrate. 
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4.6. The establishment of the separate administrative judicial division 
After the removal of the originally prepared reform package, the Government continued the 
work towards two main directions. One of them was the amendment on certain acts 
concerning the judiciary in December 2019 and in parallel, the other was the dissolution of 
the separate administrative and labor courts. Instead of this solution, a unitary judicial system 
was outlined, within that;a separate administrative branch should have been set u pin eight 
county courts of the country.
72
 Against the judgements of these courts, an appeal might be 
lodged to the Curia. The establishment of these divisions was scheduled on 1 April 2020 but 
after the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, it was again uncertain, whether this 
exceptionally long story could step forward. Despite the extra-ordinary circumstances, the 
Government confirmed its intention to set up the new framework of administrative justice, 
which started to function on the originally allocated date. 
 
5. The main experience of the two proposed administrative justice reformsin Hungary 
The recent history of the Hungarian administrative justice system demonstrates excellently the 
populist vision of judicial review over administrative decisions. This approach emphasises a 
stronger executive supervision over the administrative tribunals: the minister of justice could 
make certain decisions in cooperation with the judicial self-governing bodies, but the later 
should be wested with effective powers as counterbalances against the ministerial 
competences. However, it is contestable, what is meant by the effective participation of 
judicial self-governing bodies in the decision-making processes. The professional work of the 
administrative tribunals shall be fully independent, but these entities are maintained from 
public money, therefore, the executive might have even strong competences in financial 
matters. 
A further point is, that the populist approach considers administrative justice as an inherent 
value, which could serve the effective, and professional review of administrative decisions. 
The judicial treatment of administrative matters need such a special knowledge, and these 
cases have such specialities, which provide a proper basis to establish a separate branch of the 
judiciary to hear these controversies. 
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The two reform attempts shortly after each other also embodied that populist attitude, which 
does not respect the stability of the legal system, would lead to a continuous reorganization of 
administrative justice.
73
It may depend on the personal preferences, which model is seen as 
thebest to organize judicial review over administrative decisions, but it is beyond doubt, that 
the rapidly changing legal environment could not serve predictability and legal certainty. 
The main lesson from the Hungarian sample is that such a crucial segment of the state, as 
administrative justice should be reorganised only after inclusive and deep professional 
discussion on the ground of long-term strategies.
74
 Since administrative justice may concern 
the fundamental rights of everyone, if this judicial branch is changed frequently, public 
confidence may be undermined, which would be perceptible in all fields of our life. 
 
Conclusion 
So what we could say as a concluding remark about the recent Hungarian administrative 
justice reform? It was the great possibility of the Hungarian administrative justice, or a merely 
politically motivated project to undermine the independent administrative justice in Hungary? 
Obviously, the answer would be complex, as administrative justice was really a contested 
matter in Hungary from the democratic transition. As several models of administrative justice 
have been applied in Hungary during the last one and a half century, it was a real demand to 
find the most suitable framework for this branch of judiciary. The issue was the lack of clearly 
elaborated ideas and aims, which lead to insufficient preparation, and a huge number of 
contested issues around the reform attempts. These events also showed, that it is at least really 
difficult to identify an European standard of administrative justice, a broad range of different 
solutions exist in the diverse countries. Our aim was not to provide an exclusive framework 
for administrative courts, but to conceptualize the conflicting arguments and to demonstrate, 
how the populist view of this matter varies from the traditional approach. The Hungarian 
experience might not be concluded at the current stage, further development may also arise. 
The analysis of theseand also potentially forthcomingreform attempts may be relevant not 
only for Hungary, but also for other countries to avoid similar, ill-considered endeavours in 
the field of administrative justice. 
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